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 The Historical Basis of Securities 
Arbitration as an Investor Protection 
Mechanism 
Jill Gross* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the very beginnings of stock and bond trading in the United States, the 
securities industry has used arbitration to resolve disputes among industry partici-
pants.1  Despite securities arbitration’s deep roots in American history, most de-
scriptions of its background and use begin with the Supreme Court’s 1987 water-
shed decision in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,2 in which the Court 
held that claims arising under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange 
Act)3 were arbitrable.4  Two years later, in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Amer-
ican Express, Inc.,5 the Court held that claims arising under the Securities Act of 
1933 (Securities Act)6 also were arbitrable.7  The Court’s comfort level with secu-
rities arbitration in both cases was enhanced by the substantial oversight of the ar-
bitration forum and its procedures exercised by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC).8 
The McMahon and Rodriguez decisions led to an explosion in the use of arbi-
tration to resolve investors’ disputes with their securities firms.9  Today, in fact, 
                                                          
*Professor of Law, Pace Law School.  This article has benefited from comments and feedback re-
ceived at a symposium on the history of arbitration hosted by the Center for the Study of Dispute Reso-
lution at the University of Missouri School of Law on November 13, 2015.  I am grateful for the extraor-
dinary research assistance of Gail F. Whittemore, J.D., M.L.I.S., Reference/Special Collections Librar-
ian, Pace Law School, and Rana Abihabib, J.D. Candidate, Pace Law School, May 2016. 
 1. See infra Part II.B. 
 2. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
 3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ll (2014)). 
 4. See Barbara Black, The Past, Present and Future of Securities Arbitration between Customers and 
Brokerage Firms, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 412-
56 (J. Markham & R. Gjyshi, eds., 2014) (providing a thorough discussion of developments in securities 
arbitration after McMahon); see also Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, 16 
FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 361 (1987/1988); Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: 
The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 998-1005 (2002) [hereinafter Black 
& Gross, Making It Up] (detailing changes in securities arbitration after McMahon). 
 5. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 6. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (2014)). 
 7. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 485-86. 
 8. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233-35; see also Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation 
of Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 495 (2008) [hereinafter Gross, McMahon 
Turns Twenty] (discussing McMahon Court’s reliance on SEC oversight of SRO arbitration). 
 9. See Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty, supra note 8, at 494. 
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most disputes between customers of broker-dealer firms and the firms and their as-
sociated persons must be arbitrated through FINRA Dispute Resolution,10 a division 
of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the largest securities self-
regulatory organization (SRO) in the United States.11  These arbitrations are re-
quired either because the broker-dealer firm included a pre-dispute arbitration 
clause in its form customer agreement (PDAA)12 or the customer invoked its un-
conditional right to demand arbitration under FINRA Rule 12200.13 
As a result of the virtually mandatory nature of customer arbitration, investor 
advocates have argued that the process is unfair, inefficient, expensive, and biased 
towards the securities industry.14  A FINRA-funded study published in 2008 found 
significant negative perceptions of the fairness of the process, particularly among 
investors.15  In response to the negative critique, the securities industry touts arbi-
tration as an efficient, inexpensive, and fair process to resolve customer disputes.16  
                                                          
 10. See Mediation and Arbitration, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-me-
diation (last visited Jan. 17, 2016) (reporting that “FINRA operates the largest securities dispute resolu-
tion forum in the United States”); FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., http://www.finra.org (last visited Jan. 17, 
2016) (stating that “FINRA handles more than 99 percent of the securities-related arbitrations and me-
diations in the U.S.”). 
 11. See Market Participants, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://m.inves-
tor.gov/introduction-markets/how-markets-work/market-participants (last visited Dec. 4, 2015). 
 12. It is widely reported that virtually all broker-dealers include a pre-dispute arbitration clause in 
their retail customers’ agreements. See Final Rep. of the FINRA Disp. Res. Task Force 46, FIN. INDUS. 
REG. AUTH. (2015), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Final-DR-task-force-report.pdf. 
 13. 12200. Arbitration Under an Arbitration Agreement or the Rules of FINRA, Code of Arbitration 
Procedure for Customer Disputes, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH. (2008), http://finra.complinet.com/en/dis-
play/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4106 [hereinafter FINRA CUSTOMER CODE].  Because 
FINRA does not define “customer” within the meaning of this rule, courts have struggled to come up 
with a precise definition. See Jill Gross, The Customer’s Non-Waivable Right to Choose Arbitration in 
the Securities Industry, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. __ (forthcoming 2016). 
14. See, e.g., Mark Schoeff, Jr., PIABA Claims Arbitrator Bias – FINRA Lashes Back, 
INVESTMENTNEWS, Oct. 7, 2014, http://www.investmentnews.com/arti-
cle/20141007/FREE/141009934/piaba-claims-arbitrator-bias-finra-lashes-back (reporting on PIABA 
study alleging FINRA arbitrator bias); Edward Brunet & Jennifer J. Johnson, Substantive Fairness in 
Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 459 (2008) (arguing that securities arbitration is substantively 
unfair); The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1782 Before the Subcomm. on the Consti-
tution, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of the Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association (PIABA) in 
Connection With the Subcommittee’s Review of the Arbitration System); Mark A. Tepper, Survey 
Says—SRO Arbitration Unfair, 12 PIABA BAR J. 11 (2005); Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the 
Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C. L. REV. 123, 126 (2005) (arguing 
that “serious reforms are necessary in securities arbitration before one can support the claim that this 
system provides a principled alternative to adjudication”). 
 15. See Jill Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of Inves-
tors’ Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 349. 
 16. See FIN. SERVS. INST. & BRIGGS & MORGAN, P.A., THE EFFICACY OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION 
AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE (2010), http://www.financialservices.org/uploaded-
Files/FSI_Content/Advocacy_Action_Center/Resources_and_Reference/White_Papers/fsi_white_pape
r_april2010_final.pdf (concluding that FINRA arbitrations are more cost-effective and resolve more 
quickly than litigation); SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MARKETS ASS’N, WHITE PAPER ON ARBITRATION IN THE 
SECURITIES INDUSTRY (2007), http://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/societies/sifma_compli-
ance_and_legal_society/whitepaperonarbitration-october2007.pdf [hereinafter SIFMA WHITE PAPER] 
(arguing that securities arbitration is fair to investors).  The Financial Services Institute is an advocacy 
organization for Independent Broker-Dealers.  About Us, FIN. SERVS. INST., http://www.financial-
services.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2015). The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Associa-
tion (“SIFMA”) is “the voice of the nation’s securities industry, bringing together the shared interests of 
hundreds of broker-dealers, banks and asset managers.”  About SIFMA, SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MARKETS 
ASS’N, http://www.sifma.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2015). 
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As a result, FINRA, with its statutory obligation to enact rules that both facilitate 
trading in a “free and open market” and protect investors,17 remains under constant 
pressure to reform its arbitration process to ensure it is fair to all users. 
In 2010, the politically-charged clamor for stronger regulation of the financial 
services industry culminated in the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act.18  One provision in that massive reform bill delegates 
to the SEC the task of deciding whether “the public interest” and “the protection of 
investors” requires it to ban arbitration clauses in customer agreements, and ex-
pressly authorizes the SEC to enact such a rule change.19  Investor advocates re-
peatedly call on the SEC to exercise this power, citing the need for investors to have 
a choice of forum,20 while the industry contends that the firms’ right to mandate 
arbitration of disputes is a “vital component of this [securities arbitration] system” 
because “[s]uch agreements help shape the public policy in favor of arbitration that 
has been recognized by both Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court.”21  Ironically 
and significantly, in response to pressure on the SEC to ban PDAAs in customer 
agreements, the industry, through its trade association SIFMA, threatened to insert 
a forum selection clause in customer agreements to supersede a customer’s right to 
arbitration under FINRA Rule 12200 if the SEC did in fact ban PDAAs.22 
Why do broker-dealers fear a legal system in which the firms’ customers have 
a unilateral right to demand arbitration of disputes?  That scenario would return the 
industry to the pre-McMahon years, when, because the enforceability of PDAAs 
with respect to federal securities laws was in doubt, most brokerage customers had 
such a unilateral right.  In fact, the pre-McMahon history of securities arbitration, 
written about only sparsely, reveals that, today, the primary stakeholders in the pro-
cess—investors and brokerage firms—have lost sight of the original reason why the 
securities industry heavily relied on arbitration to resolve industry disputes.  While 
offering a speedy, efficient, and fair forum was important to the industry when 
                                                          
 17. 15 U.S.C. §78o-3(b)(6) (2012). 
 18. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
l. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.) (Dodd-Frank).  For the 
legislative history and development of this provision, see Jill I. Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities 
Arbitration?, 30 PACE L. REV. 1174, 1180-83 (2010) [hereinafter Gross, End of Mandatory Securities 
Arbitration]. 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(o) (providing that “[t]he Commission, by rule, may prohibit, or impose conditions 
or limitations on the use of, agreements that require customers or clients of any broker, dealer, or mu-
nicipal securities dealer to arbitrate any future dispute between them arising under the Federal securities 
laws, the rules and regulations thereunder, or the rules of a self-regulatory organization if it finds that 
such prohibition, imposition of conditions, or limitations are in the public interest and for the protection 
of investors”).  The provision provides no deadline for action, and, as of early 2016, the SEC has taken 
no action pursuant to this express power. 
 20. Press Release: PIABA Announces Strong Support For Investor Choice Act Barring Mandatory 
Arbitration, PUB. INVESTORS ARBITRATION BAR ASS’N (Feb. 27, 2015), https://piaba.org/piaba-news-
room/press-release-piaba-announces-strong-support-investor-choice-act-barring-mandatory-ar. 
 21. Pre-Dispute Arbitration Resource Center, SEC. IND. & FIN. MARKETS ASS’N, 
http://www.sifma.org/issues/legal,-compliance-and-administration/pre-dispute-arbitration/overview/ 
(last visited Dec. 4, 2015). 
 22. See Kevin Carroll, OpEd: Why Banning Mandatory Securities Arbitration Would be a Mistake, 
WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (May 27, 2015), http://wealthmanagement.com/commentary/op-ed-why-
banning-mandatory-securities-arbitration-would-be-mistake (predicting that, if the SEC banned manda-
tory arbitration clauses in customer agreements, “[s]ome [member firms] might elect to include forum 
selection clauses in their customer contracts in order to supersede the FINRA mandatory arbitration rule, 
and require that all disputes be resolved in court”). 
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choosing to offer and encourage arbitration, far more important was the use of ar-
bitration as a mechanism to protect investors from unscrupulous brokers and bro-
kerage firms, thus building trust and credibility in the securities exchanges, and, in 
turn, facilitating investors’ use of the exchanges for their securities trading. 
This article describes a more accurate history of securities arbitration, and un-
covers the original purpose of designating arbitration to resolve investor disputes.  
This article argues that both investors and the industry have disregarded this under-
lying purpose, causing them to view securities arbitration through a distrusting, crit-
ical lens.  Rather than cynically viewing securities arbitration as a forum created by 
and favoring industry players, investors should view arbitration as a central and 
critical component in a system of investor protection.  Likewise, rather than pro-
moting mandatory arbitration as desirable because of its speed and economies, bro-
ker-dealers and SIFMA should advertise the investor-protective benefits of the pro-
cess.  By reframing modern securities arbitration as an investor protection device, 
both industry and investors’ advocates can work within the system to improve it 
rather than fight to tear it down. 
II.   PRE-MCMAHON HISTORY OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION 
A. The Formation of Securities Exchanges in the U.S. 
Shortly after the birth of the United States, at the First Congress in 1789 and 
1790, the federal government issued $80,000,000 in bonds (then called “stock”) to 
finance the country’s assumption of the Revolutionary War debts of the Continental 
Congress as well as of the separate colonies.23  The need to trade in these newly-
issued securities led to the rise of the stock brokerage business in New York.  In 
1792, a group of brokers reached an agreement to trade only with each other on 
behalf of their clients, and to charge a minimum commission of 0.25 percent.24  
Known as the “Buttonwood Agreement” because legend has it that it was signed 
under a buttonwood tree on Wall Street,25 the Agreement of 1792 governed dealings 
among New York City stockbrokers until the founding of the New York Stock and 
Exchange Board (NYSE Board) in 1817.26 
The NYSE Board was one of the first SROs in the U.S. securities industry.27  
Its first Constitution and bylaws set forth principles governing the stock brokerage 
practices of its members, banned certain sales practices, fixed commissions, and 
mandated suspension from the Board for any member who “fails to comply with 
                                                          
 23. FRANCIS L. EAMES, THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 13 (1894). 
 24. Id. at 14. 
 25. Henry C. Lucas, Jr. et al., Information Technology and the New York Stock Exchange’s Strategic 
Resources from 1982-1999, #CIS-2002-08, CIS WORKING PAPERS SERIES 5-6 (May 2002), 
http://cisnet.baruch.cuny.edu/papers/cis200208.pdf. 
 26. EAMES, supra note 23, at 17-18. 
 27. The Institution of Experience: Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities Industry, 1792-
2010, The Rules of the Club, Protecting the Members and the Market, SEC. & EXCH. COMM. HISTORICAL 
SOC’Y, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/sro/sro02b.php (last visited Dec. 21, 2015) 
[hereinafter Rules of the Club] (reporting that NYSE Board patterned its internal rules and regulations 
on those of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange). 
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his contracts.”28  The Constitution also called for expulsion of any member who 
refused to comply with NYSE Board rules.29 
Membership in the NYSE Board continued to climb through the 1800s, as the 
securities industry grew.  In the mid-1800s, a seat on the NYSE Board sold for a 
few hundred dollars.30  The Civil War stimulated more speculative trading,31 which 
propelled the price of a seat on the exchange to sell for $8,000 by 1868.32  By then, 
the NYSE Board had changed its name to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),33 
and was known as an exclusive club, with caps on membership and monetary bar-
riers to entry.34  The NYSE attempted to monopolize trading so that investors could 
not take their business elsewhere.  It also set its own rules to ensure that members 
treated traders equitably and only legitimate stocks backing stable issuers could be 
listed on the Board.35 
Due, in part, to the NYSE’s reputation for exclusivity, a group of brokers not 
admitted to membership formed the “Open Board of Brokers” in 1864 as a compet-
itor to the NYSE.36  In 1869, the Open Board of Brokers consolidated into the NYSE 
to form the stock exchange and SRO that existed until 2007,37 when NYSE merged 
its regulatory and arbitration functions with the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD), to form FINRA.38 
B.   Arbitration at the NYSE 
Even in its early days, the securities industry used alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms to resolve internal industry disputes.  This likely was a carryover from 
England, where arbitration had been utilized to solve disagreements among mem-
bers of trade groups since the fourteenth century.39  In the United States, merchants 
                                                          
 28. EAMES, supra note 23, at 22 (quoting CONSTITUTION OF THE NEW YORK STOCK AND EXCHANGE 
BOARD 1820, art. 13). 
 29. Id. (citing Article 15). 
 30. Id. at 85. 
 31. See JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 23 BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER SEC. 
& COMMODITIES LAW § 1:5, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015). 
 32. Id. § 1:7. Adjusted for inflation, that would cost approximately $136,000 in 2015 dollars.  See 
Inflation Calculator, DAVEMANUEL.COM, http://www.davemanuel.com/inflation-calculator.php (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2016). 
 33. EAMES, supra note 23, at 43 (“On January 29, 1863, the title of the ‘New York Stock and Exchange 
Board’ was changed to the ‘New York Stock Exchange.’”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Rules of the Club, supra note 27. 
 36. The Institution of Experience: Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities Industry, 1792-
2010, The Rules of the Club, Adaptability and Gentility, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’ HISTORICAL SOC’Y, 
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/sro/sro02d.php (last visited Dec. 21, 2015). 
 37. See American Stock Exchange Historical Timeline, N.Y. STOCK EXCH., 
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/American_Stock_Exchange_Historical_Timeline.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 01, 2016); see also EAMES, supra note 23, at 50-52 (discussing the history of consolidation). 
 38. On July 30, 2007, NASD and NYSE Regulation, including their respective arbitration forums, 
consolidated and formed FINRA.  See Press Release, FINRA, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation 
Combine to Form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH. (July 30, 2007), 
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2007/P036329.  FINRA is a “national securities associ-
ation,” a type of SRO registered with the SEC under the Exchange Act.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(k) (2012). 
 39. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 969-72 (1999) (describing the history of arbitration); Johnson, supra note 
14, at 134. 
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used arbitration to resolve internal industry disputes since the colonial era.40  In the 
late 1790s, NYSE Board clerks ruled on disputes over mismatched trades.  Known 
as “out-trades,” these were trades in which, during the trade settlement process, a 
buy order did not match a sell order, either in price, number of shares, or accrued 
interest.41 
The very first constitution of the NYSE Board (1817) required disputes to be 
arbitrated before the full Board.42  The NYSE Board Constitution of 1817 provided 
that “All questions of dispute in the purchase or sale of Stocks shall be decided by 
a majority of the Board.”43  At some point after 1817, as membership numbers in-
creased, the NYSE Board appointed an ad hoc Arbitration Committee, made up of 
five NYSE members, to decide each case, and that committee would report to the 
full Board for action.44  The Arbitration Committee heard and decided the case 
within days after its filing, and the NYSE itself forced members to comply with any 
award.45  Moreover, the NYSE Board considered internal arbitration awards to be 
precedent.46 
The ability of this early 1800s NYSE Board to accept jurisdiction over the ar-
bitration of customer (non-member/member) disputes was critical.  While Article 
11 of the 1817 NYSE Board Constitution does not explicitly provide for jurisdiction 
over non-member/member disputes, it also does not appear to restrict the Board’s 
jurisdiction to only intra-member disputes.  Rather, it requires members to submit 
to arbitration for all disputes regarding securities trading without restriction on who 
brought the complaint to the NYSE Board.  Moreover, at least as early as 1831, 
records from the NYSE Board reveal that its Arbitration Committee resolved non-
member/member disputes.47 
C.   Why Arbitration? 
Why did the securities industry designate arbitration as its preferred dispute 
resolution process from the very beginning?  As discussed below, the historical ev-
idence suggests it was primarily to ensure that industry norms would be enforced, 
even if those norms were unlawful and not enforceable in court, and secondarily to 
provide a rapid resolution of a dispute whose value changed quickly as the stock 
market rose or fell. 
The overarching consideration of nineteenth century arbitration committees ap-
pears to have been the protection of the good name and reputation of the NYSE.48  
                                                          
 40. Johnson, supra note 14, at 134. 
 41. See Lucas, et al, supra note 25. 
 42. EAMES, supra note 23, at 21. 
 43. Rule 17, Transcript of Constitution of the New York Stock & Exchange Board (Feb. 25, 1817), 
available at http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rack-
cdn.com/collection/papers/1810/1817_0225_NYSEConstitutionT.pdf. 
 44. EAMES, supra note 23, at 45, 74; see also STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES 
REGULATION 272 (1998) (describing NYSE Board arbitration commitees).  According to Eames, who 
was the President of NYSE in 1894, each year the NYSE Governing Committee designated standing 
committees, including the “Arbitration Committee of nine members, to which are referred all money 
claims arising from transactions in money or securities”.  EAMES, supra note 23, at 74. 
 45. See BANNER, supra note 44, at 272 (citing more than one dozen such disputes that were reflected 
in NYSE Board Arbitration Committee reports). 
 46. Id. at 274. 
 47. Id. at 272-73. 
 48. Id. at 273. 
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If one NYSE Board broker reneged on a commitment to another, the functioning of 
the exchange and smooth trading would be impeded.  Moreover, if customers of 
NYSE Board brokers could not trust that their brokers would be held to their word 
and commitments, customers would take their business elsewhere.  The NYSE 
Board believed it was important to accept complaints from non-members so it could 
enforce its own rules, customs, and practices and also ensure good conduct of its 
members.49  Furthermore, it was widely understood that arbitrators treated member 
brokers more harshly than non-member customers because the NYSE Board could 
compel a member to comply with the arbitrators’ award but could not compel a non-
member to comply with an award.50 
In addition, by requiring members to arbitrate disputes with non-members (usu-
ally customers) at the non-member’s request, the NYSE created a “miniature legal 
system” to enforce the exchange’s extra-legal rules and practices.51  Certain specu-
lative sales practices that NYSE brokers engaged in were not enforceable in court, 
such as “time bargains”–agreements to sell or transfer shares of government debt or 
corporate stock that the seller did not own at the time of the contract.52  From 1792 
to 1858, a series of New York statutes voided all contracts for the sale of stock in 
which the seller did not own the stock on the contract date.53  Yet, NYSE brokers 
made money selling time bargains to investors and they did not want to give up 
commissions generated from selling that “product.”54  While courts would not en-
force time bargains,55 NYSE Board arbitrators would, as they did not have to follow 
only the law; they could base their decisions on rules, customs, and practices of the 
exchange or principles of equity.56  Thus, disputes over time bargains would have 
to be resolved in arbitration to protect the customer so that the NYSE would remain 
a credible exchange on which to place trades.  Customers could have confidence 
that NYSE arbitrators would enforce time bargains, if otherwise validly made. 
Securities arbitration also provided a tribunal available immediately to render 
a predictable decision on a dispute arising in a fast-moving market.  In White v. 
Brownell,57 one of the few reported cases stemming from a nineteenth century se-
curities arbitration, the New York Court of Common Pleas observed: 
                                                          
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. BANNER, supra note 44, at 271. 
 52. Id. at 271-72. 
 53. See id. at 173 (quoting N.Y. LAW, ch. 62 (1792)) (“An Act to prevent the pernicious practice of 
stock jobbing, and for regulating sales at public auctions.”).  A series of amendments to the statute pre-
served this ban until 1958, when the New York legislature enacted “An Act to legalize the sale of stocks 
on time.”  Id. at 174 (quoting N.Y. LAWS, ch. 134, § 1 (1858)). 
 54. BANNER, supra note 44, at 280.  Historians estimate that time bargains made up about 20% of the 
transactions on the NYSE Board between 1818 and 1840.  Id. at 175. Indeed, the NYSE Board’s 1817 
Constitution, Article 11th, referred to time bargains, and sets forth a procedure if one party defaulted on 
a time bargain.  EAMES, supra note 23, at 21. 
 55. Courts would not award legal or equitable relief to a plaintiff who suffered as a result of a counter-
party’s default on a time bargain, reasoning that the plaintiff was equally at fault for entering into an 
illegal contract in the first place.  See BANNER, supra note 44, at 176 (collecting cases). 
 56. Id. Interestingly, one non-NYSE Board, three-member arbitration panel issued an award in the 
mid-1800s also enforcing a time bargain over a strong dissent arguing that only a panel of the NYSE 
Board could enforce a contract that was otherwise void at law.  See DANIEL LORD, A VINDICATION OF 
THE AWARD BETWEEN BOORMAN, JOHNSTON & CO. AND JACOB LITTLE & CO. (1842) (enforcing a time 
bargain in favor of investor). 
 57. White v. Brownell, 3 Abb. Pr. N.S. 318 (N.Y. Com. Pl. 1867), aff’d, 4 Abb. Pr. N.S. 162 (N.Y. 
Com. Pl. 1868) (upholding arbitration award from Open Board of Brokers). Though it survived as a 
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[T]he [New York] Open Board of Brokers, with its several hundred mem-
bers, the business transacted at its rooms being daily large in amount, and 
the stocks and securities dealt in being ever fluctuating in value, it was not 
unreasonable to apprehend that there would be constantly occurring dif-
ferences between members, acting as agents for others, in regard to the 
terms of contracts, and as to the obligations and duties of contracting par-
ties under agreements often hastily made.  The temptation to avoid a con-
tract in a rapidly rising or falling market, as the pecuniary interest of a 
party might prompt, rendered it imperative that some tribunal in the body 
of the association, should be appointed and agreed upon, to take cogni-
zance of and exercise jurisdiction over all claims and matters of difference 
which might arise between members of the board. This appears the more 
important, as confidence in each other, and in the engagements which they 
might make, one with the other, and in the fairness, openness, and upright-
ness of their transactions, and in the certainty that their engagements would 
be fulfilled are announced as the causes which led to the organization. To 
be effective, their decisions should be prompt. As these engagements 
would be constantly maturing, it was eminently proper that a tribunal 
should be near to render speedy and exact justice. Confidence is the real 
life of such engagements; hence, the appointment of a committee of arbi-
tration is a prominent feature in the constitution of this board, and, by the 
express assent of each member, jurisdiction is awarded to this committee 
in advance of all claims and matters of difference which might arise be-
tween the members.58 
In addition to speed and predictability, the Brownell court favored the mecha-
nism of arbitration as implementing the membership’s will to establish and bind 
other members to precedent as established by the arbitrators, and instilling confi-
dence in the members and users of the exchange that justice—defined by equitable 
rather than legal principles—would prevail.   
In 1869, after the consolidation of the Open Board of Brokers with the NYSE 
Board to form the NYSE, the NYSE amended its constitution to officially require 
members of the Exchange to submit to arbitration whenever requested by a non-
member.59  At that time, the NYSE established a more permanent nine-member 
                                                          
competitor to the NYSE Board for only a short time (1864-1869), the Open Board of Brokers used 
arbitration, too, as its mechanism to resolve trading disputes.  Id. 
 58. Id. at 328-29. 





nge%20constitution%20of%201869&f=false (establishing an “Arbitration Committee, to consist of nine 
members, whose duty it shall be to investigate and decide all claims and matters of difference arising 
between members of the Exchange; they shall also adjudicate such claims as may be preferred against 
members by non-members, when such non-members shall agree to abide by the rules of the New York 
Stock Exchange, in such cases provided”); id., By-laws Art. LII, Arbitration of Claims of Non-Members 
35-36 (“Any person not a member of the Exchange shall have the right to bring a claim arising from any 
transaction against a member of said Exchange, before the Arbitration Committee, …”); Norman S. 
Poser, Making Securities Arbitration Work, 50 S.M.U.L. REV. 277, 280 (1996) (“The NYSE Constitution 
of 1869 not only provided for arbitration of ‘all claims and matters of difference’ between members but 
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Arbitration Committee to hear and decide claims.  The committee met regularly: In 
1894, the Arbitration Committee met every Tuesday and Friday.60  The arbitrations 
that took place in the 1800s were in fact speedy and thus inexpensive, and the arbi-
trators held NYSE members to their word, thus upholding investors’ bargains.  
Though used infrequently to resolve investor disputes,61 the NYSE arbitration fo-
rum and its guarantee of access to investors served a critical investor protection 
function. 
Consistent with this impetus to protect customers, the NYSE retained in all 
subsequent incarnations of its Constitution and rules the right of a customer to de-
mand arbitration of a stock exchange member firm.62  This clause of the NYSE 
Constitution has been described as “the most significant of the measures taken to 
implement the self-regulation contemplated by the 1934 Act.”63 
By the end of the nineteenth century, arbitration was established as the primary 
mechanism to resolve disputes in the securities industry.  Nineteenth-century au-
thors praised the NYSE for developing arbitration: “The New York Stock Exchange 
has distinguished itself in many respects, but there is probably nothing for which it 
is likely to become more famous in history than its solution to the great problem of 
settling disputes and misunderstandings by arbitration.”64  While speed and cost 
contributed to its acceptance by exchange members, the historical record shows that 
investor protection was an indispensable feature of securities arbitration, thus en-
suring its continued success. 
D.   Twentieth Century Pre-McMahon SRO Arbitration 
From the late 1800s until the passage of the federal securities laws in the 1930s, 
the securities industry and securities arbitration remained largely unregulated.  
However, one important legislative development marginally related to the securities 
industry ultimately did impact SRO arbitration.  In 1925, Congress passed the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act (FAA),65 which declared pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.66    The Supreme Court declared that the passage 
                                                          
also gave non-members the right to arbitrate disputes with members if they agreed to abide by the rules 
of the Exchange.”).   I have not located any historical documents that explain why this provision was 
added at this time. 
 60. EAMES, supra note 23, at 84. 
 61. Id. at 69-70 (describing state of NYSE arbitration as of 1894 and noting that “[a]s an evidence of 
the good business methods prevailing, only about seven cases a year have of late been brought before 
the Arbitration Committee”). 
 62. N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE CONST., art. XI (Westlaw through 2006); N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE 
ARBITRATION RULE 600(a) (Westlaw through Aug. 6, 2007).  Before its 2007 merger with NASD, 
NYSE Rule 600(a) provided: “Any dispute, claim or controversy between a customer or non-member 
and a member, allied member, member organization and/or associated person, arising in connection with 
the business of such member, allied member, member organization and/or associated person, in connec-
tion with his activities as an associated person shall be arbitrated under the Constitution and Rules of the 
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. as provided by any duly executed and enforceable written agreement 
or upon the demand of the customer or non-member.”  Id. 
 63. Coenen v. R. W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1215 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 64. HENRY CLEWS, TWENTY-EIGHT YEARS IN WALL STREET 561 (1888).  I am indebted to Robert S. 
Clemente, former Director of NYSE Arbitration, for finding this gem in Mr. Clews’ book.  See Robert 
S. Clemente, Trends in Securities Industry Arbitration: A View of the Past, Present and the Future: ‘The 
Dream, the Nightmare and the Reality,’” 68 N.Y.S.B.A. BAR J. 18, 19 (Sept./Oct. 1996). 
 65. Pub. L. 68–401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012)). 
 66. FAA, 9 U.S.C. §2 (2012).  That section provides: 
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of the FAA reflects “an emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolu-
tion,”67 thus giving  rise to the widespread use of arbitration clauses in commercial 
contracts.  Over the subsequent 90 years, the Court’s decisions interpreting the FAA 
created a body of law enforcing arbitration agreements strictly according to their 
terms and elevating the arbitration clause to a “super-contract.”68 
After the stock market crash of 1929 led to the Great Depression, a concerned 
Congress enacted the federal securities laws to restore investor confidence in and 
facilitate the healthy functioning of capital markets.69  Premised on a philosophy of 
full disclosure rather than caveat emptor for investors, the Exchange Act imposed a 
complex regulatory scheme on the securities industry and created a new federal 
agency, the SEC, to enforce that scheme.70 
The SEC quickly involved itself in arbitration of investor claims.  Just one year 
after its creation, in 1935, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recom-
mended to Congress that the NYSE offer an independent arbitral tribunal for cus-
tomer cases.71  Fueled by a new skepticism about the honesty and integrity of bro-
kers, the SEC supported arbitration of securities disputes but did not want NYSE 
members serving as arbitrators.  In a memorandum to the NYSE, the Chairman of 
the SEC stated: “The right to arbitration before the arbitration committee of the 
exchange is at present granted to any customer regardless of the contract between 
the member and the customer.”72  To address its concerns regarding the composition 
and neutrality of arbitration panels for those customer arbitrations, the SEC recom-
mended to the NYSE that it maintain this right for customers but also provide an 
option for arbitration before independent arbitral tribunals rather than just before 
the NYSE.73 
At first, the NYSE responded that the customer could elect to go to court in 
lieu of arbitration before the Exchange.  The SEC replied that the NYSE could cir-
cumvent this election by “encourag[ing] its members to offer customers a standard 
arbitration agreement requiring that resort be had to arbitration at the election of 
                                                          
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transac-
tion, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit 
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract. 
 67. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012) (quoting KPMG LLP v. 
Cocchi, 132 S.Ct. 23, 25 (2011) (per curiam); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) 
(declaring the FAA reflects a “national policy favoring arbitration”). 
 68. See Jill I. Gross, Justice Scalia’s Hat Trick and the Supreme Court’s Flawed Understanding of 
Twenty-First Century Arbitration, 81 BROOKLYN L. REV. 111 (2015).  Because securities transactions 
“involve commerce,” the FAA governs PDAAs in the securities industry.  See Howsam v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
 69. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Fa-
cilitates Capital Formation, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,  http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2015). 
 70. See Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty, supra note 8, at 512. 
 71. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opinion Letter, Release No. 34-131 (Mar. 21, 1935), as reprinted in 
WestLaw, 1935 WL 29028, at *3. In the memorandum, the SEC set forth its views on a variety of arbi-
tration and non-arbitration issues as part of a review of the NYSE’s rules and procedures. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  (“Since the customer can at any time prior to arbitration choose to seek his remedy in the 
courts, continued maintenance of this policy possesses no disadvantage, provided that the Exchange also 
encourages arbitration before independent arbitral tribunals as an additional remedy available to custom-
ers.”).  The NYSE did not follow this recommendation. 
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either the customer or the member, and providing for arbitration before independent 
arbitral tribunals at the election of the customer.”74  Thus, the SEC itself seems to 
have promoted the very practice it now is empowered to abolish: broker-dealers’ 
insertion of PDAAs in their retail customer agreements. 
Gradually, more and more broker-dealers inserted PDAAs in their retail cus-
tomer form agreements, and litigated customers’ challenges to their enforceabil-
ity.75  However, until the 1960s, very few customer disputes ended up in arbitration 
because Supreme Court precedent at the time declared PDAAs unenforceable with 
respect to claims arising under the federal securities laws.76 As long as investors 
alleged a cause of action arising under a federal securities law, they could bring 
their complaint in federal court.  And, until 1985, courts often would exercise sup-
plemental jurisdiction over pendent state law claims.77 
In the 1960s, several federal courts began granting firms’ motions to compel 
arbitration if the only viable claims in a customer’s complaint arose under state 
law.78  As a result, brokerage firms started enforcing—against their customers’ 
wishes—previously ignored PDAAs.79 At the same time, the SROs began enhanc-
ing the formality of their arbitration forums and establishing procedural rules for 
these modern arbitrations.  In 1964, AMEX started administering an arbitration pro-
gram.80  The NASD, an SRO that was growing in size and importance to the indus-
try, adopted its first Code of Arbitration Procedure in 1968, providing an alternative 
to the NYSE for the arbitration of customer disputes.81  The Chicago Board Options 
Exchange, Inc. (CBOE) adopted arbitration for options disputes in 1973.82  To in-
crease the use of arbitration, the securities SROs further developed their arbitration 
procedures through the 1970s.83 
                                                          
 74. Id. 
 75. See Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World of Securities Arbi-
tration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (1993) (noting that the “securities industry fought persistently 
for mandatory arbitration”). 
 76. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (holding claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 are 
not arbitrable), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) 
(holding claims arising under the Securities Act are arbitrable). 
 77. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).  Before the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Dean Witter Reynolds that district courts must compel arbitration of pendent state law claims even if 
parallel federal claims were not arbitrable, lower courts would either refuse to compel arbitration of  
pendent state claims or stay arbitration pending the outcome of the federal court litigation.  Id. at 221-
22 (citing examples). 
 78. See, e.g., Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache, 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966) (affirming dismissal of all 
federal causes of action and grant of motion to compel arbitration of a NYSE customer dispute); Robin-
son v. Bache & Co., 227 F. Supp. 456, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (granting motion to refer customer dispute 
to arbitration that was “barren of any allegation” that defendant violated federal law). 
 79. See Deborah Masucci, Securities Arbitration-A Success Story: What Does The Future Hold?, 31 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183, 185 (1996) (tracing back to the 1970s rise of use of arbitration in the secu-
rities industry as a response to the increase of small investors investing in the stock market). 
 80. See Margaret M. Harding, The Cause and Effect of the Eligibility Rule in Securities Arbitration: 
The Further Aggravation of Unequal Bargaining Power, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 109, 181 n.30 (1996). 
 81. See Masucci, supra note 79, at 185.  NASD first offered only a purely voluntary arbitration system, 
but, in 1972, NASD amended its rules requiring member firms and associated persons to submit to arbi-
tration at the request of a customer.  Id. 
 82. Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Securities Industry Arbitrations: An Examination and 
Analysis, 53 ALB. L. REV. 755, 769 (1989). 
 83. See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 
279, 283-84 (1984); Norman S. Poser, Making Securities Arbitration Work, 50 SMU L. REV. 277, 280-
87 (1996); see also Black & Gross, Making It Up, supra note 4, at 998-1005 (discussing development of 
arbitration procedures). 
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In 1975, Congress amended the securities laws to enhance the SEC’s oversight 
over SROs.  In particular, the Exchange Act now required the SEC to review and 
approve all SRO rule proposals and amendments, after a period for public com-
ment.84  Pursuant to the amendments, the SEC could not approve an SRO rule unless 
it was: 
designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to pro-
mote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coor-
dination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing 
information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in securities, to 
remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open mar-
ket and a national market system, and, in general, to protect investors and 
the public interest; . . . .85 
In the late 1970s, the SEC helped form the Securities Industry Conference on 
Arbitration (SICA) to develop uniform arbitration rules.86 The SEC approved pro-
posals by all the SROs to adopt the Uniform Code of Arbitration as their arbitration 
code, including the unilateral right of a customer to demand arbitration with a mem-
ber.87  This accelerated the evolution, already begun in the early twentieth century, 
of securities arbitration from an informal, speedy hearing before an expert, industry-
affiliated panel to a protracted, litigation-like, heavily regulated hearing before non-
expert neutrals with virtually no industry experience or knowledge. 
The next section turns to the more well-known, post-McMahon securities arbi-
tration, which signals a shift away from the investor-protection benefits of the pro-
cess. 
III.   POST-MCMAHON SECURITIES ARBITRATION 
In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court reversed its long-standing precedent88 and 
held that federal securities claims arising out of customer account agreements were 
arbitrable.89  The Court concluded that arbitrators were competent to apply the law 
and therefore the forum permitted investors to pursue their statutory rights as well 
as in court.90  Notably, the Court’s comfort with SRO arbitration, grounded on its 
                                                          
 84. See Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty, supra note 8, at 512-13 (describing 1975 Amendments as 
“adding an indispensable layer of statutory regulation over SRO arbitration with an express statutory 
purpose of enhancing investor protection”). 
 85. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2012). 
 86. See Jill I. Gross, AT&T Mobility and the Future of Small Claims Arbitration, 42 SW. L. REV. 47, 
64 (2012); Black & Gross, Making It Up, supra note 4, at 998. 
 87. See, e.g., In re NASD, Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
16860, 20 SEC Docket 233 (May 30, 1980) (approving NASD’s adoption of Uniform Code of Arbitra-
tion); see also Implementation Of An Investor Dispute Resolution System, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-13470, 12 S.E.C. Docket 186 (Apr. 26, 1977) (inviting SROs to submit proposals to SEC). 
 88. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (expressly overruling Wilko and holding that Securities Act claims are arbitra-
ble). 
 89. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). See Black & Gross, Making It Up, 
supra note 4, at 995-98 (providing a more in-depth discussion of the reasons behind the Supreme Court’s 
overruling of Wilko). 
 90. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 229-32. 
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view that arbitrators follow the law, ignores the founding premise of SRO arbitra-
tion as a forum in which arbitrators could ignore the law and apply equity instead 
to protect investors from brokers. 
After McMahon and the sharp increase in the use of SRO arbitration, the SROs 
regularly engaged in reviews of their arbitration processes to ensure they offered a 
fair forum.91  However, unlike the historical focus on investor protection, modern 
reforms, at least publicly, focused on maintaining a speedy, cost-effective, and bal-
anced dispute resolution mechanism.  For example, in 1994 the NASD Board of 
Governors appointed an Arbitration Policy Task Force to study the securities arbi-
tration process administered by the NASD and to make suggestions for its reform.92  
The resulting 1996 Report on Securities Arbitration Reform, also known as the 
Ruder Report,93 concluded that securities arbitration is a “relatively efficient, fair, 
and less costly forum for resolution of disputes involving public investors, member 
firms, and firm employees” but the Task Force “believes that many areas of im-
provement of the system exist.”94  The Ruder Report did not inform its readers that 
it focused on the investor-protection benefits of the system, nor did it appear to take 
into account NASD’s investor protection mandate when recommending improve-
ments.  Rather, most of its recommendations focused on countering and reducing 
the increasing litigiousness of arbitration.95 
Following the Ruder Report, the NASD embarked on an ambitious program to 
adopt many of the report’s recommendations.  Between 1997 and 2007, NASD filed 
more than 65 rule proposals.96  In a 2007 Report Card assessing the post-Ruder 
Report reforms, NASD stated that it had implemented “nearly every key recom-
mendation” of the Report.97  NASD reiterated its objectives in reforming the pro-
cess: “to preserve and respect the basic elements of a fair and efficient dispute res-
olution system, while responding to the changing needs of our customers by em-
bracing the modifications needed to enhance the system.”98  Again, investor protec-
tion was not mentioned. 
More recently, in July 2014, FINRA recognized that it had been almost 20 years 
since the publication of the Ruder Report, so it convened a new task force.99  As 
FINRA announced, 
FINRA Dispute Resolution is committed to providing a fair, efficient, and 
economical forum to resolve disputes among investors, securities firms, 
                                                          
 91. Black & Gross, Making It Up, supra note 4, at 998-1005. 
 92. DAVID S. RUDER, ET. AL., SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION 
POLICY TASK FORCE TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES 
DEALERS, INC. 1 (1996). 
 93. The Task Force was chaired by David S. Ruder, then a Professor of Law at Northwestern Univer-
sity School of Law.  See David S. Ruder, NORTHWESTERN PRITZKER SCH. L.,  http://www.law.north-
western.edu/faculty/profiles/davidruder/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2016). 
 94. RUDER, ET. AL., supra note 92, at 1. 
 95. Id. at 7. 
 96. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty, supra note 8, at 514. 
 97. NASD Dispute Resolution, The Arbitration Policy Task Force Report – A Report Card, FIN. 
INDUS. REG. AUTH. 5 (July 27, 2007), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Industry/p036466.pdf 
(noting that “in several areas the path to implementation and the final outcome may be different than the 
Task Force recommended or envisioned”). 
 98. Id. at 27. 
 99. See News Release, FINRA Announces Arbitration Task Force, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH. (July 17, 
2014), https://www.finra.org/newsroom/2014/finra-announces-arbitration-task-force. 
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and individual brokers. . . .  FINRA has formed a task force to consider 
possible enhancements to its arbitration and mediation forum.100 
Chaired by Barbara Black,101 FINRA populated the Task Force with lawyers 
who regularly represent customers, broker-dealers, and associated persons, as well 
as neutrals, a state securities regulator, and an investor advocate.  FINRA asked the 
Task Force to suggest strategies to “enhance the transparency, impartiality, and ef-
ficiency of FINRA’s securities dispute resolution forum for all participants.”102  No-
where in its charge does FINRA expressly ask the Task Force to focus on investor 
protection.  As a result, not unexpectedly, the Task Force’s December 2015 Report 
does not analyze whether FINRA DR satisfies its investor protection obligations.103 
This article does not argue that FINRA arbitration is, in fact, unfair, nor does it 
argue that FINRA DR neglects its investor protection mandate.  In fact, FINRA 
immediately promised to fight to retain Rule 12200 for investor protection purposes 
in response to the securities industry’s threat to advocate for its repeal if the SEC 
were to ban mandatory arbitration.104 
Moreover, no doubt as a result of the post-McMahon reforms implemented with 
robust SEC oversight over SRO arbitration,105 customer arbitration today at FINRA 
DR (which administers more than 99% of securities arbitrations in the country)106 
offers many features that protect investors.  In addition to subsidizing fees for cus-
tomer claimants,107 FINRA DR provides customers with the right to select a panel 
consisting of no arbitrators with ties to the securities industry108 and the right to 
presumptively discoverable documents from respondents.109  Forum rules sharply 
restrict respondents from filing pre-hearing dispositive motions.110  These features 
collectively ensure that a customer claimant has an opportunity for a full hearing 
before a panel of unbiased arbitrators.  Also, the forum enforces its policy of not 
accepting class arbitrations, instead preserving by rule an investor’s right to bring 
                                                          
 100. Id. 
 101. Retired Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. See Barbara Black, UNIV. OF 
CINCINNATI, COLL. OF L., http://www.law.uc.edu/faculty-staff/faculty/barbara-black (last visited Feb. 4, 
2016). 
 102. FINRA Dispute Resolution Task Force, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., http://www.finra.org/arbitration-
and-mediation/finra-dispute-resolution-task-force (last visited Jan. 26, 2016). 
 103. See Final Report and Recommendations of the FINRA Dispute Resolution Task Force, FIN. INDUS. 
REG. AUTH. (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Final-DR-task-force-report.pdf.  Of 
course, the presence of investor advocates on the Task Force itself does reflect FINRA’s sensitivity to 
its investor constituencies. 
 104. See Open Meeting of the SEC Investor Advisory Committee, U.S. SEC. & EXCHAN. COMM’N (May 
17, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/otherwebcasts/2010/iacmeeting051710.shtml (video recording of 
Linda Fienberg, President (now retired), comments at the 2:07-2:09 mark). 
 105. Gross, End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration, supra note 18, at 1186. 
 106. FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., https://www.finra.org/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2015). 
 107. Gross, End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration, supra note 18, at 1188. 
 108. See FINRA Manual, FINRA Customer Code 12403(c)(1)(A), FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH. (Sept. 30, 
2013), http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4141 (providing 
parties with right to strike all arbitrators from the non-public list). 
 109. See FINRA Manual, FINRA Customer Code 12506(a), FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH. (May 16, 2011), 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4160. 
 110. See FINRA Manual, FINRA Customer Code 12504, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH. (June 6, 2011), 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=7377. 
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any aggregable claims as a class or collective action in court.111  To enhance trans-
parency, the forum now requires arbitrators to issue an explained award if all parties 
jointly request one.112  And, most significantly, a member firm and/or an associated 
person’s failure to pay an arbitration award to an investor results in membership 
suspension or revocation.113 
Yet, FINRA’s public pronouncements in the area of dispute resolution—often 
in the context of fending off criticism of its arbitration procedures—focus on the 
efficiencies and level playing field of securities arbitration, not on its investor pro-
tection characteristics.114  Likewise, when FINRA broadly promotes its investor 
protection efforts, it does not include arbitration.115  Joining FINRA in its focus, 
investor groups also urge FINRA to offer a level playing field in its arbitration fo-
rum.116  The industry, while recognizing investor protection characteristics, simi-
larly aspires to an “equal protection” system.117  Rather than depicting FINRA ar-
bitration as an alternative dispute resolution process offering a level playing field, 
FINRA, as well as industry and investor advocates, should recall and reinforce the 
historical basis of securities arbitration as a mechanism to protect investors. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
I have no doubt that the securities arbitration system has played and continues 
to play a critical, even irreplaceable, role in the national scheme of investor protec-
tion.  Yet, that role—confirmed by the historical record as dating back to the origins 
                                                          
 111. See FINRA Manual, FINRA Customer Code 12204, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH. (Dec. 15, 2008), 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4110. In April 2014, the 
FINRA Board of Governors sanctioned Schwab for inserting a class action waiver in its customer agree-
ments, in violation of FINRA rules. See FINRA Department of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab, Board 
of Governors Decision, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH.  (Apr. 24, 2104), https://www.finra.org/sites/de-
fault/files/NACDecision/p496824.pdf;  see also Barbara Black & Jill Gross, Investor Protection Meets 
the FAA, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX. LITIG. 1 (2012) (providing a detailed analysis of the issues ultimately 
resolved by the Board of Governors). 
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Commission, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH. 2 (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/rule_fil-
ing_file/SR-FINRA-2015-034-response-to-comments.pdf (“FINRA disagrees that the proposed rule 
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of U.S. stock exchanges—is neglected in the current narrative of securities arbitra-
tion, as stakeholders are focused on the fight over mandatory PDAAs.  Investor 
advocates’ push to ban mandatory arbitration led to the securities industry’s reflex-
ive counter-push for a repeal of the long-standing right of a customer to demand 
arbitration of member firms.  This backlash ultimately hurts the retail investor, be-
cause it threatens to undermine the integrity and viability of arbitration,118 possibly 
eliminating a forum that offers investors a more equitable alternative to court for 
the resolution of disputes with firms.119  Backlash against the process will continue 
unabated until process participants reframe their narrative and rehabilitate the pro-
cess as an investor protection mechanism. 
                                                          
 118. See Gross, End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration, supra note 18, at 1194 (arguing that banning 
mandatory arbitration ultimately would be bad for investors). 
 119. See Black & Gross, Making It Up, supra note 4, at 1047 (concluding that investors fare better in 
SRO arbitration as compared to court). 
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